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1 Introduction  
 
The discourse on business and human rights has developed over the past two to three 
decades with changing emphases: from no link between the two at all, through the 
concepts of corporate social responsibility with voluntary standards and processes, to 
calls for direct responsibility for human rights violations by businesses themselves, and 
states’ obligations to protect individuals from infringement by private entities such as 
corporations.  Throughout these debates, there are a number of recurring themes in 
terms of the role of the state and their obligations.  The traditional human rights 
approaches negate a direct role of business in human rights violations, as per definition, 
as only states are obligation holders.  Furthermore, this tradition also focuses on a one-
dimensional approach to human rights obligations where the domestic state is the only 
possible human rights obligations holder within its territory. Consequently, this 
tradition has hampered a more nuanced approach to obligations in a complex, globalised 
world.   
  
In recent years, there has been increased debate about the limitations of this one-
dimensional approach to human rights obligations, and it should be emphasised that this 
debate has not come about as a result of the 2014 UN Human Rights Council’s 
resolution to start the drafting process of a legally binding international treaty on 
business and human rights.1  Over the past few decades, human rights lawyers, 
practitioners, international institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
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have repeatedly argued for more diverse approaches to human rights obligations, and 
the time may now have come to find ways to address this through binding international 
law provisions.   
 
This diverse attention to the content of human rights obligations has addressed several 
different aspects, such as whether non-state actors may have human rights obligations, 
and how this relates to state obligations; whether human rights obligations are exclusive 
to one state at the time, or whether they can be combined in some concept of shared or 
joint obligations with other actors (including other states); whether state obligations are 
restricted to its domestic territory or they go beyond this geographical sphere; and 
finally whether states can be complicit in human rights violations committed by other 
states or other non-state actors.    
 
Amongst these varied approaches to the subjects and the content of obligations, a strong 
and growing recognition that human rights obligations are not necessarily confined to a 
state’s territory has emerged.2  This work has challenged the notion of territorial 
confinement of obligations, and is commonly labelled as extraterritorial human rights 
obligations.3  A major milestone in this work was the adoption of the Maastricht 
Principles on States’ Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and 
                                                          
2 There is a rapidly growing literature in this field, but some of the central contributions can be mentioned: 
M, Gibney; K. Tomasevski; J. Vedsted-Hansen, “Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of 
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Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law” (2007) 
40 Modern Law Review, 598, M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalizing World: 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp: Intersentia 2009);  M. Gibney and S. 
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2010); M. Langford;  W. Vandenhole; M. Scheinin, and W. van Genugten Global Justice, State Duties: 
The Extra-Territorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  
 
3 For a critical analysis of the terminology used in debates regarding extraterritorial human rights obligations, 
see M. Gibney ‘On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations”, in Langford et.al, Global Justice, n 2.  




Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles) in September 2011.4  However, while the 
concept of extraterritorial obligations (ETOs) is gaining increasing interest and 
acceptance in regional human rights courts5 and the UN human rights mechanisms,6 the 
general recognition of such human rights obligations among states is still missing. In 
other areas of international law, the right and obligation to regulate the conduct of agents 
of the state (and also private actors), when they act extraterritorially is often recognised.  
For example, according to Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act (2003), the United 
Kingdom makes it a criminal offence to engage in sexual activity with a person under 
the age of 16 within and outside the borders of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.7 
Furthermore, in compliance with the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of 
Financing of Terrorism, many countries have passed legislation to enable a pursuit of 
individuals and institutions that fund terrorism.  For instance, the United States has,  
in conjunction with other initiatives, enacted a substantial body of post 9/11 laws 
and regulations that define new crimes, create new civil causes of action, expand 
the jurisdictional reach of U.S. laws, and enhance the authority of U.S. 
prosecutors to target, investigate, and prosecute domestic and foreign 
individuals, financial institutions, and other entities.8 
                                                          
4 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights adopted by a group of experts meeting in Maastricht in September 201.  
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/library/maastricht-
principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23. (last accessed 4 August 2016). The relevance of 
these Principles will be discussed in detail below. 
5 There is a rapidly growing body of case-law that concerns extraterritorial obligations in regional human 
rights courts.  Some of the key cases are: Georgia v. Russian Federation [2008] ICJ 140;  Loizidou v. 
Turkey [1995] ECHR 10;  Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others [2001] ECHR 890; Case 9903 Rafael 
Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. United States [2001] IACHR 51/01; Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, 
Application no. 55721/07 [2011] ECHR 1093 (7 July 2011);  Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba 
("Brothers to the Rescue")Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, report No. 86/99, case no. 11.589, 
29 September 1999 
6 The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Working Paper Human Rights Law 
Sources: UN Pronouncements on Extra-Territorial Obligations Concluding Observations General 
Comments and Recommendations Special Procedures UPR Recommendations November 2015.  Available 
at: http://globalinitiative-escr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/151027-Human-Rights-Law-Sources-
ETOs.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2016). 
7 Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act (England and Wales (2003), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/pdfs/ukpga_20030042_en.pdf (last accessed 8 August 2016).  
8 A. Lakatos and J. Blöchliger ‘The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti‑Terrorist Finance Laws’, GesKR 3 
(2009), www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&guid...d91e... (last accessed 8 
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Similarly, in environmental law, it is now generally accepted that the obligation to cause 
’no-harm’ in territories of another state has gained the status of customary international 
law and that states consequently need to ensure that activities within their territories do 
not have damaging effect outside their borders.9 
Consequently, the application of extraterritorial obligations within the sphere of human 
rights law is nothing new in international law, but rather an extension of practices 
currently being undertaken in other areas.  
Following the Human Rights Council’s resolution to start the work on the drafting of a 
potential treaty on business and human rights, the debates on the content and subjects 
of obligations have moved one step forward, and international human rights lawyers 
now find themselves in a situation where they have to respond to the challenges to the 
traditional approach to human rights obligations, and accept that the world has changed 
rapidly since the drafting of the international covenants on human rights in the 1950s 
and 60s. But this is not only a challenge; it is also an opportunity to move international 
human rights law forward.  Many human rights lawyers have been frustrated by the 
narrow approach in traditional human rights law, and there has been a concern that 
developments in the international community and international relations are changing 
the reality within which human rights are being enjoyed or violated, and without 
changes to our understanding of obligations, human rights law may become less 
relevant for the victims of human rights.  In her important contribution to the human 
rights obligations discourse, Margot Salomon argues that ‘the proper regulation of non-
state actors, notably transnational corporations (TNCs), […] requires revisiting 
international standards and mechanisms to ensure that their activities are consistent with 
human rights’,10 and that doing so is necessary ‘if human rights law is to remain 
relevant’.11  
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No. 14-17, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486421 (last accessed 8 August 2016)  
10 Salomon, Global Responsibility, n 2, p. 11 
11 Ibid., p.12  




Regarding business and human rights, and in particular about the role of the TNCs 
‘home’ state,12 there has been much debate as to the current state of obligations.  Those 
supporting a broader approach to human rights obligations reflecting the globalised 
world in the twenty-first century argue that current international human rights law 
already contain existing ETOs in this field.13  However, others have firmly argued that 
‘at present States are not generally required under international human rights law to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction’.14 The opportunity now being presented to the international community is 
not only to deal with the direct responsibility of businesses with regard to international 
human rights standards, but equally to clarify the role of the state as an obligation holder 
when regulating business activities within and beyond their borders.  
 
In this chapter, I will address the new initiative of negotiating a binding treaty on 
business and human rights from the perspective of states’ ETOs.   I will start in Part 2 
with a consideration as to why states’ ETOs are relevant for the treaty initiative, and 
how they manifest themselves in relationship to business or corporations.  Part 3 will 
then address where the debate on ETOs stands today and some of the major oppositions 
to such state obligations in the sphere of human rights.  The chapter will explore in Part 
4 the content of the obligation to regulate extraterritorially, and then  deal with some of 
the difficulties that may be encountered when attempting to get acceptance for the 
obligation to regulate.  
 
2 Why State Regulation of Transnational Corporations?  
                                                          
12 The term ‘home state’ will be used to indicate the state where the TNC ‘or its parent or controlling 
company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantial 
business activities;” (Text taken from Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle 25).  
13 See for instance Maastricht Principles, Principles 24 which states: “All States must take necessary 
measures to ensure that non-State actors which they are in a position to regulate, as set out in Principle 25, 
such as private individuals and organisations, and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
do not nullify or impair the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.”  
14 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, 
Res. 17/4, 16 June 2011.   
 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; quote from page 
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In June 2014, the Human Rights Council adopted two resolutions concerning business 
and human rights: Resolution 26/9 established an open-ended intergovernmental 
working group to negotiate a legally binding international instrument on business and 
human rights, while Resolution 26/22 extended the mandate of the Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights. However, neither of these resolutions refers to ETOs of 
states to regulate the conduct of business outside their borders.  It is worth noting though 
the preamble to Resolution 26/9 emphasised that ‘…. the obligations and primary 
responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with 
the State, and that States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including transnational corporations’.15 
Furthermore, the Preamble to Resolution 26/22 confirmed that:  
policies and proper regulation, including through national legislation, of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises and their 
responsible operation can contribute to the promotion, protection and 
fulfilment of and respect for human rights and assist in channelling the 
benefits of business towards contributing to the enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.16 
 
What these two quotes show is the recognition that states have obligations to promote 
human rights and protect against violations by third parties, within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction, and that one way in which this can be done is through proper regulation.  It 
is clear that Resolution 26/9 confirms that the concepts of ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ 
are not considered synonymous or necessarily to be fully overlapping.  This is essential 
in a discussion on ETOs. Resolution 26/22 confirms the role of regulation to address 
the human rights impacts of TNCs activities.  
However, why do we need regulation beyond borders and compliance with ETOs in this 
context?  The International Chamber of Commerce has rightly pointed out that ‘a 
“fundamental problem” in establishing accountability for corporate abuses is the state’s 
                                                          
15 Emphasis added  
16 Emphasis added  




failure to meet obligations under current international human rights law, and lack of 
enforcement of domestic laws.’17 The sentiment in this quote is true: if all states 
managed to meet their obligations under current international human rights law, we 
would not be discussing this issue at all. In other words, international human rights law 
requires states to regulate the conduct of public and private entities within their territory 
to the extent that all human rights for all individuals are protected.  This is the essence 
of the obligation to protect, which is generally accepted in the human rights 
community.18 However, the reality is that many states are unwilling or unable to 
implement the standards to which they have agreed by ratifying international human 
rights treaties.  Those unable tend to be the states that struggle with lack of resources to 
carry out the implementation; those unwilling are the states that have the opportunity to 
protect human rights, but fail to do so, either because of domestic structural opposition 
or because priorities other than human rights take precedence in the domestic political 
struggle.  Yet, while the tripartite classification of obligations (the obligation to protect 
being the ‘middle’ one) is now generally accepted in the domestic setting, there is still 
opposition to this typology of obligations being applied to activities over which states 
have influence, but which take place outside their territory.  Thus, the concept of 
‘unwillingness’ may also extend to states that are home states to TNCs engaging in 
business practices abroad, but who fail to regulate the conduct of these TNCs for 
practices which would not be acceptable at home. For instance, the home state of a TNC 
producing garments regulate against employing children under the age of 16 when they 
operate within the home state, but the same state tacitly (due to lack of regulation) 
                                                          
17 Joint IOE-ICC-BIAC Comments on the Draft Guiding Principles (January 26, 2011) quoted in Tuttle, 
Nicole R. “Human Rights Council Resolutions 26/9 and 26/22:  Towards Corporate Accountability?” 
(2015) 19 ASIL insights, Issue 20, 3 September 2015; 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/20/human-rights-council-resolutions-269-and-2622-
towards-corporate (last accessed 4 August 2016)  
18 Both the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
confirm this obligation.  The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment no. 31 provides that “the 
positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals 
are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts 
committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as 
they are amenable to application between private persons or entities.” (para. 8) UN Human Rights 
Committee, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326 May 2004, para. 8. The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights holds that “The right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types or 
levels of obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. […] The obligation 
to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals 
of their access to adequate food.” UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment no. 12 Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, E/C.12/1999/5 
12 May 1999, para. 15.    




accepts that the same company employ 11 year olds abroad. Thus, it is the failure of 
states to implement the agreed human rights standards that necessitates further attention 
to regulation of business operations in abroad.  
 
3  Extraterritorial Obligations and Regulation of Business  
 
The question of states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations has received 
considerable attention in recent years, and this reflects a growing practical concern over 
the effects of activities of states and of actors over which states exercise jurisdiction 
and/or control outside their own borders.  It also reflects a philosophical return to the 
concept of universal human rights, and recognition that such universal human rights are 
an illusion if obligations are considered to be only territorial.19 In the words of Mark 
Gibney, ‘Universality means, quite simply, [….] that while states are responsible for 
the human rights violations they carry out within their own domestic borders, they can 
also be responsible for violating human rights outside their own borders.’20 However, 
while the attention has been growing regarding states’ ETOs for their own conduct,21 
and indeed to regulate the conduct of TNCs, no explicit international human rights law 
exists which imposes direct liability on TNCs for human rights violations.22 The 
developments that have come about in the last few years include significant attention to 
and a growing recognition of extraterritorial human rights obligations on the part of 
states by academics, NGOs, the regional and UN human rights systems, and also states 
themselves. 23 
                                                          
19  S. Skogly “Extraterritoriality: Universal human rights without universal obligations” In S. Joseph and 
A. McBeth (eds.) Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law. (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2010); Gibney, Mark International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles, 2nd edn. 
(Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2015) p. 2  
20 Gibney, Universal Principles, n 19 , p. 2  
21 While the case-law on extraterritorial obligations of states is growing, most of the cases relate to states’ 
behaviour in other states’ territory either through military occupation, military or police activity, or through 
their own agents.  For a review of case-law and this predominance of attention to these kinds of operations, 
see G. O Cuinn, G and S. Skogly “Understanding Human Rights Obligations of States Engaged in Public 
Activity Overseas: the Case of Transnational Education”, 20 International Human Rights Journal 761. 
22 McCorquodale and Simons Responsibility beyond Borders, n 2, p. 599.  
23 In Germany and the Netherlands, an Independent Complaint Mechanism has been set up to address 
environmental, social and related issues arising from business activities by German and Dutch companies 
requiring them to establish and administer appropriate mechanisms to address project-related complaints 





Regional courts, most notably the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights are increasingly hearing cases that relate to 
states’ activities internationally, including control of their agents when acting abroad.  
These decisions tend to focus on civil and political human rights due to the conventional 
mandates of these Courts.  Furthermore, the Maastricht Principles – which according to 
the preamble are ‘drawn from international law and aim to clarify the content of 
extraterritorial States’ obligations to realise economic, social and cultural rights’ – are 
increasingly being used by international human rights bodies, such as the UN human 
rights committees and special rapporteurs.24  While focused on economic, social and 
cultural rights, the Maastricht Principles emphasise that ‘All States have obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and 
social rights, both within their territories and extraterritorially’.25  
 
Before moving into the specific discussion as to what states ETOs are or should be in 
terms of regulation of TNCs, the debate on the existence of extraterritorial human rights 
obligations should be visited to address some of the concerns of those that are opposed 




The concept of sovereignty is fundamental in international relations and in international 
law.  In its basic content, sovereignty implies political independence and territorial 
integrity as recognised in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter).26  In 
                                                          
from affected communities.  For further information, see: https://www.deginvest.de/DEG-Documents-in-
English/About-DEG/Responsibility/DEG_Complaints-Mechanism_2014_05.pdf (last accessed 4 August 
2016). 
 
24 For a compilation of references to the Maastricht Principles and extraterritorial obligations by UN 
institutions, see The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Human Rights Law Sources, 
n6. 
25 Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle 3  
26 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter provides “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 




terms of the functioning of international law, the principle confirms that states are able 
to freely accept international law obligations through ratification of treaties or tacit 
acceptance of customary law, and that agreements or membership in international 
organisations that may reduce a state’s sovereignty, shall be entered into on a voluntary 
basis.  However, as the purpose of international law is to regulate the conduct between 
and among states, the content and functioning of international law will inevitably have 
an effect on a state’s ability to exercise its sovereignty with respect to the substantive 
content of the treaties entered into and customary law accepted and the obligations 
contained therein.   
 
International human rights law in its early days following the adoption of the UN 
Charter challenged traditional notions of sovereignty.  States had by that time become 
accustomed to cooperating with each other through treaties to carry out their 
international affairs.  However, the way in which each state treated its citizens and 
residents domestically was, before the Second World War, considered to be the sole 
domain for the domestic authorities.  The adoption of the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and subsequent human rights treaties eroded the full 
sovereignty in this regard, and it has become accepted that human rights law sets limits 
for a state’s legitimate treatment of its own population. In essence, the way in which 
states treat their own population is now an issue of legitimate international concern.27 
 
The challenge to sovereignty on the basis of ETOs is different though.  What is being 
considered here is the effects on human rights enjoyment of individuals of one state’s 
action or omission within the territory of another state, and arguments are put forward 
that this may infringe upon the other state’s (‘host state’) sovereignty.  If state A 
regulates the conduct of a corporation (corporation Z) under its jurisdiction when that 
corporation operates in state B, the concern is that this will infringe upon the sovereignty 
of state B.  The argument is that state B should be able to accept whatever behaviour of 
                                                          
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.” 
27 W. M. Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 The 
American Journal of International Law, 866 at 869. 




corporation Z no matter how it treats its employees for instance, and that this is a 
consequence of state B’s sovereignty.  Thus, while it is now generally accepted that the 
international community (and indeed foreign states) has a legitimate interest in the way 
in which a state treats its own citizens, requiring certain behaviour by TNCs to ensure 
that they do not breach international human rights standards when operating in other 
states is still seen to be a threat to the sovereignty of that foreign state.  Writing about 
ETOs generally, Gibney posits that ‘now it is more likely that countries will be able to 
hide behind the sovereignty of another state in order to remove themselves from any 
and all responsibility in assisting an outlaw state’.28 Translated into the topic of concern 
for this chapter, it would imply that states ‘hide behind the sovereignty of another state’ 
in order to remove themselves from any and all responsibility regarding the human 
rights effect of the actions or omissions by TNCs over which they have regulatory 
power.  States are concerned that by regulating the conduct of private parties (whether 
individuals or corporations) when they act within the territory of another state, they 
somehow breach the sovereignty of that state.  While a legitimate consideration, the 
conclusion that states should not regulate the conduct of such actors fails to take into 
account several aspects of these relationships.  
 
First, the home state of the TNC is not asked to direct the host state as to how to legislate 
or carry out policies.  The home state only deals with the conduct of the entity over 
which it has regulatory control.  Thus, it is the effect of the conduct of the TNC that is 
in question,29 rather than the conduct of the host state.  Indirectly, it could be seen as a 
criticism of the host state as such regulation by the home state could be considered to 
be an implicit criticism of the way the host state fails to control the conduct within their 
territory.   
                                                          
28 Gibney, Universal Principles, n 19, p. 2 
29 O. D Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M. Salomon, and I. Seiderman “Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights”, (Maastricht Commentary) (2012) Human Rights Quarterly 1084.  The Maastricht Commentary 
holds that an ‘approach to regulating the conduct of transitional corporations consists of a state imposing 
on a parent corporation domiciled in that state an obligation to comply with certain norms wherever they 
operate (i.e., even if they operate in other countries). Or an obligation to impose compliance with such 
norms on the different entities they control (their subsidiaries, or even in certain cases their business 
partners)’, 1141.  





However, this leads to the second point: if the way in which a state treats its own citizens 
is now a legitimate human rights concern for other states and the international 
community generally, then it would surely be a legitimate concern for any state to 
regulate the behaviour of the TNCs under its control, whether it operates within or 
outside its borders.  At the end of the day, the concern is for the welfare and indeed the 
rights of individuals in that other state – a legitimate concern – and not breaching 
sovereignty.   
 
Third, in a number of other areas of international law, states accept that treaties and 
agreements contain significant clauses concerning domestic regulation and conduct.  
This is clearly the case for international trade agreements, international agreements in 
the area of the environment, and treaties concerning terrorism.  As detailed above,30 a 
number of areas of international concern now regularly accept that regulation of conduct 
by private parties and agents of the state across borders is necessary to comply with 
international law obligations.  Somehow, there seems to be more resistance to 
introducing international standards regarding human rights regulation into bilateral and 
multilateral agreements than is the case for other areas of international cooperation.31   
 
The question of jurisdiction 
In much of the debates on ETOs, attention is given to the concept of jurisdiction.  The 
question of jurisdiction has often produced a ‘doctrinal bar’ against the acceptance of 
extraterritorial human rights obligations; while at the same time jurisdiction has on 
occasion been the catalyst for ‘permissive or even prescriptive exercise of 
extraterritorial conduct’.32  This discussion has its origins in the questions of sovereignty 
as indicated above, but also in the wording in some international human rights treaties 
                                                          
30 See Introduction 
31  Ming Du discusses in an interesting article how the WTO accepts limitations to trade based on ‘public 
morals’, when the same is not the case for concerns for human rights.  See, M. Du “Permitting Moral 
Imperialism? The Public Morals Exception to Free Trade at the Bar of the World Trade Organization”, 
(2015) draft article, p. 3; on file with author 
32 Maastricht Commentary, n 29, 1105. 




that refer to jurisdiction as one of the qualifications for the reach of obligations.  For 
example, Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) stipulates that ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant’; Article 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights prescribes that ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention’; and Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that 
‘The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and 
full exercise of those rights and freedoms’.33   
 
We see that in these three significant human rights treaties, the reference to jurisdiction 
has been used in all of them, while the reference to territory can only be found in the 
ICCPR.  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not contain any 
reference to territory or jurisdiction, and this is also the case for the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).34   
 
It is outside the scope of this chapter to give a thorough account of the debates that have 
taken place regarding the understanding of jurisdiction related to extraterritorial human 
rights obligations; this has been thoroughly done elsewhere.35 However, it should be 
noted that the ECtHR has dealt with these issues in a number of prominent cases,36 and 
this is also the case for the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights,37 
                                                          
33 Emphasis added in all quotes.  
34 It is worth noting that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights specifically refers 
to states parties’ obligations to ‘take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation 
…. to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant ….’.  
ICESCR, Article 2(1).  
35 See in particular section II ‘Jurisdiction’ in Langford, et.al  Global Justice, n 2.   
36 See inter alia Georgia v. Russian Federation [2008] ICJ 140;  Loizidou v. Turkey [1995] ECHR 10;  
Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others [2001] ECHR 890; Issa v. Turkey  App No 31821/96 [2004] 
ECHR 629 Case 9903 Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. United States [2001] IACHR 51/01 
37 For instance, Case 9903 Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. United States [2001] IACHR 51/01; Armando 
Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba ("Brothers to the Rescue") Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 
report No. 86/99, case no. 11.589, 29 September 1999 




and the UN Human Rights Committee.38 Based on this jurisprudence, it is submitted 
that concepts of ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ are now recognised to be different and not 
necessarily overlapping.  The ECtHR has determined that in exceptional circumstances 
the reach of the European Convention can go beyond the geographic area covered by 
the territories of the Contracting States.39 This is also the case for the other judicial 
bodies mentioned.40 The perceived change in the approach to what is covered by 
jurisdiction is a reflection of the more complex world within which we live, and where 
states’ actions and omissions may have further ramifications outside their territorial 
borders than what has traditionally been the case in international law.  An understanding 
of jurisdiction that includes control not only over territory but also of persons (natural 
as well as legal) is now gaining recognition.41 
 
Part of the complexity related to jurisdiction that has hampered the acceptance of ETOs 
is the division between domestic jurisdiction which is compulsory for governments and 
permissible extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., where states may choose to adopt 
extraterritorial legislation, such as extending criminal responsibility).42 In terms of the 
case-law on ETOs, the Courts have generally accepted that, apart from exceptional 
circumstances, states jurisdiction is mainly territorial: when acting outside their borders 
                                                          
38 One of the first cases before the UN Human Rights Committee where the territoriality of jurisdiction was 
rejected was Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (52/79) A/36/40, 184  
39 Bankovic n5, para 71 
40 In the Coard case the Inter-American Commission on human rights held that “under certain 
circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an extraterritorial locus will not only be 
consistent with but required by the norms which pertain. The fundamental rights of the individual are 
proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination -- "without 
distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex." Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a 
person's humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to 
its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons within a state's territory, it may, under given 
circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the 
territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state – usually through the acts of the latter’s 
agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence within a 
particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights 
of a person subject to its authority and control.” Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Report Nº 
109/99, September 29, 1999, Inter-Am.C.H.R; para. 37 
41 In Al-Skeini the Court distinguished between ‘state agent and control’ over persons on the one hand, and 
‘effective control over an area’ on the other. Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 
55721/07 [2011] ECHR 1093 (7 July 2011); paras 133 and 138 respectively. For a thorough discussion on 
the changes in approach to jurisdiction through the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, see 
O Cuinn and Skogly, Understanding Human Rights Obligations, n 21. 
42 Lagoutte, Stéphanie “New Challenges Facing States within the Field of Human Rights and Business”, 
(2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 176 




(either directly or indirectly), they are not within the jurisdiction as defined by the 
various treaties (this has in particular been the stance taken by the ECtHR), and the 
Court loses its jurisdiction to hear such cases.  The critics of this approach argue that 
once states actions have effect outside their territory, these actions (or indeed omissions) 
represent an exercise of the state’s jurisdiction.  This reflects what Gondek refers to as 
the ‘most common meaning of jurisdiction by states [which] concerns the scope of 
competence of a state, delimited by international law, to regulate the conduct of physical 
and legal persons, and to enforce such regulation.’43  
 
The Maastricht Principles contain the following definition of the ‘scope of jurisdiction’ 
in the context of extraterritorial human rights obligations:  
A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and 
cultural rights in any of the following:  
a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, whether 
or not such control is exercised in accordance with international law;  
b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable 
effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether 
within or outside its territory;  
c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through 
its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in a position to exercise 
decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and 
cultural rights extraterritorially in accordance with international law.44 
 
This passage from the Maastricht Principles emphasizes that jurisdiction relates to a 
state’s authority or effective control, where the state’s acts or omissions bring about 
foreseeable effects, and situations where the state may exercise decisive influence.  
                                                          
43 Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World, n 2, 47.  Emphasis in original.  
44 Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle 9.  Please note that the Principles focus on economic, social and 
cultural rights, hence the reference in the principle.  




Referring to the work of the Human Rights Committee in its interpretation of the 
ICCPR, the commentary to the Maastricht Principles notes: 
For the purpose of defining applicability of the Covenant, the notion of 
jurisdiction refers to the relationship between the individual and the state in 
connection with a violation of human rights, wherever it occurred, so that acts 
of states that take place or produce effects outside of the national territory may 
be deemed to fall within the jurisdiction of the state concerned.45 
Thus, practice shows that there is now a far more nuanced approach to jurisdiction than 
a straight overlap between a state’s territory and its jurisdiction.  Indeed, in his 
individual opinion submitted in the Lopez Burgos v Uruguay case,46 Mr Tomuchat held:  
To construe the words ‘within its territory’ pursuant to their strict literal meaning 
as excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring beyond the national 
boundaries would, however, lead to utterly absurd results. The formula was 
intended to take care of objective difficulties which might impede the 
implementation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is 
normally unable to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the 
Covenant to its citizens abroad, having at its disposal only the tools of 
diplomatic protection with their limited potential. […] Never was it envisaged, 
however, to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out 
wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity against 
their citizens living abroad.47 
This observation refers to a state’s obligation to its citizens abroad, as this was the focus 
in the relevant case (a Uruguayan citizen being kidnapped by Uruguayan security forces 
in Argentina and subsequently brought back to Uruguay and tortured). However, almost 
40 years after this individual opinion was delivered, it would be reasonable to hold that 
the approach to jurisdiction as expressed by Tomuchat would not only relate to the 
treatment of a state’s citizens living abroad, but indeed also the citizens of other states.  
                                                          
45 Maastricht Commentary, n 29, 1106 
46 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) 
at 176 (1981) 
47 Ibid., Individual opinion submitted by a member of the Human Rights Committee under rule 94 (3) of 
the Committee's provisional rules of procedure; Communication No. R.12/52; Appendix  




It is important to emphasise the part of the quote that relates to the practical difficulties 
of implementing the ICCPR abroad, and that this was seen as the main reason for the 
limitation in the Covenant.  It is submitted that when a state is in a position to exercise 
jurisdiction outside its own borders (without breaching the sovereignty of another state), 
there is no jurisdictional bar against doing so.48  
 
Neo-colonialism and universalism  
The final areas of concern for those that are hesitant to the concept of ETOs moves us 
out of the sphere of international law and into international relations, namely, the 
concern that a regulation of TNCs behaviour when operating outside of industrialised 
countries can be conceived of as imperialism or neo-colonialism.  More specifically, 
the argument is that Western states (or other industrialised states) will impose their 
standards for treatment of individuals onto other states.  This represents a dictation of 
moral/ethical standards reflecting a Western individualistic ideology which may be 
different or alien to other cultures.   The objection to ETOs on this ground represents 
more of an ideological opposition than the question of sovereignty.  However, both 
objections fail to recognise the fundamental aspect of human rights which is not the 
interests of states, but rather a standard of treatment of individual human beings no 
matter where or who they are.49  They fail to recognise the original understanding of 
universalism and of non-discrimination.  Human rights standards are not aimed at 
dictating to any government their policy choices or direction of society, as long as 
                                                          
48 The Inter-American Commission has taken a similar view in several cases.  For instance, in the Armando 
Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba, n 5, where the Cuban military had shot down two civilian aircrafts in 
international territory, the Commission held: “It should be specified, however, that under certain 
circumstances the Commission is competent to consider reports alleging that agents of an OAS member 
state have violated human rights protected in the inter-American system, even when the events take place 
outside the territory of that state.  In fact, the Commission would point out that, in certain cases, the exercise 
of its jurisdiction over extraterritorial events is not only consistent with but required by the applicable rules.  
The essential rights of the individual are proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of equality and non-
discrimination, "without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex."  Because individual rights are 
inherent to the human being, all the American states are obligated to respect the protected rights of any 
person subject to their jurisdiction.  Although this usually refers to persons who are within the territory of 
a state, in certain instances it can refer to extraterritorial actions, when the person is present in the territory 
of a state but subject to the control of another state, generally through the actions of that state's agents 
abroad. In principle, the investigation refers not to the nationality of the alleged victim or his presence in a 
particular geographic area, but to whether, in those specific circumstances, the state observed the rights of 
a person subject to its authority and control.” Para. 22; emphasis added.  
49 Gibney, Universal Principles, n 19, 3 




human rights standards as recognised, adopted and committed to by the international 
community and all individual states are adhered to.50 Put differently, human rights 
recognise that torture, censorship, and lack of access to potable drinking water and basic 
health care, affect all human beings equally no matter where they live.  This is the 
fundamental understanding of universal human rights.  However, the universal concept 
has only been recognised in half – and this is what possibly fuels the argument of neo-
colonialism.  If universal human rights mean that all individuals are supposed to be able 
to enjoy human rights no matter where they live, but only the domestic state has 
obligations, then human rights protection becomes limited to what the home state is able 
or willing to do.  Furthermore, it becomes a political and ideological game to criticise 
and shame foreign states for their human rights violations, while ignoring the human 
rights violations that could have been prevented if non-state actors such as TNCs over 
which a foreign state has jurisdiction are not considered.    
 
Another aspect of neo-colonialism that is often voiced in this context is the problem of 
conditionality.  Countries that have traditionally received assistance from industrialised 
states or from international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are wary of what they consider to be conditions for 
assistance or investment.  From the experience of conditionality linked to loans and 
‘bail-outs’ from the IFIs (the gatekeeper role that these institutions have traditionally 
held in terms of access to international financial resources),51 these recipient countries 
are concerned that industrialised countries where most of the TNCs have their 
headquarters will use regulations of the corporations as another form of conditions 
regarding their domestic policies.  From the historic discourse on human rights where 
industrialised states have been very vocal (although not necessarily consistent) in terms 
of how other states behave regarding human rights, such a reaction is understandable.  
This partly relates back to the policies of the United States under President Carter in the 
                                                          
50 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Economic 
Crisis, November 2013, 8;  
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2
664103&SecMode=1&DocId=2215366&Usage=2 (last accessed 4 August 2016).  
 
51 Skogly, Sigrun The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
(London, Cavendish Publishing, 2001),10. 




late 1970s whereby the Unites States introduced rules to prevent financial support for 
countries where massive human rights violations took place.52  Similarly, this became 
a policy for the IFIs as well, as a result of the influence of the United States within these 
institutions.   
While probably introduced with good intentions, these policies have skewed the debate, 
and not least because such policies were:  
 seen to represent interference within the internal affairs of states (which could 
potentially be legitimate, given the discussion about the legitimacy of 
international attention to human rights violations as reflected upon above);  
 the policies were not implemented consistently, and therefore smaller and less 
strategically important states often felt as ‘victims’ of these policies, rather than 
as a consistent and systematic attempt to improve the human rights situation 
worldwide; and 
 when the conditionality concerning the domestic human rights situation was the 
only focus (i.e., how the ‘recipient’ state performed) and attention with respect 
to other actors’ influence on the human rights situation (for instance TNCs), the 
neo-colonial or neo-imperialist conclusion was fairly easy to draw.  However, 
similar to the question of sovereignty, if the attention is on the activities of 
TNCs, and not what the host state is doing, the question of conditionality is not 
really relevant in this context.  
 
4 Content of the obligation to regulate 
 
Having now considered some of the controversies regarding extraterritorial human 
rights obligations generally, and those pertaining to the regulation of TNCs activities 
abroad more specifically, this chapter will now move to the key questions regarding the 
role of the state in regulating the conduct of TNCs when they operate beyond the home 
state’s national borders, and how these could be framed in a future business and human 
rights treaty. As stated by Lagoutte ‘it is so far unclear what this instrument will focus 
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on’,53 and thus the extent of the emphasis on the state is as of yet uncertain.   However, 
it is submitted that leaving the state out of the equation when drafting the treaty, would 
be counter-productive. The problem with leaving the state out of a treaty that aims at 
regulating the relationship between business and human rights is the danger that this 
may remove the state’s position as the primary obligation holder for the protection and 
promotion of human rights, as clearly laid down in the UN Charter and subsequent 
international human rights law.  There is now a growing recognition that human rights 
obligations are complex, and that the focus on ‘one violator and one violation’ is not 
sufficient. However, while the obligations debate has become more sophisticated, it is 
clear that the state still has the focal position in complying with human rights 
obligations.   The articulation of shared or joint obligations (combined with an increased 
attention to complicity in violations54) entails that more than one state may be 
responsible for human rights violations, and indeed that obligations can be shared 
between states and non-state actors.55 Yet, the obligation to regulate the conduct of third 
parties to ensure individuals’ enjoyment of human rights is an essential part of a state’s 
role, and therefore the treaty should ensure that this element is given a strong position.56  
 
While the Maastricht Principles were drafted by a group of experts, and is not per se a 
legally binding document, it is reflective of current international human rights law.57  
On that basis, the text of the Maastricht Principles could well be used as an inspiration 
for the drafting of relevant parts of the proposed treaty on business and human rights.  
There is certainly a strong case for using the commonly accepted tripartite classification 
of human rights obligations (respect, protect and fulfil).  De Schutter contends that the 
duty of the state ‘to protect human rights by regulating the behaviour of private (non-
state) actors […] belong to the acquis of international human rights law’.58 This 
                                                          
53 Lagoutte, New Challenges, n 42, 179 
54 J. G. Stewart, James G., “Complicity in Business and Human Rights” ASIL Proceedings, 2015. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2676192 (last accessed 4 August 2016)  
55 Salomon, Global Responsibility, n 2;  A. Vandenbogaerde Towards Shared Accountability in 
International Human Rights Law: Law Procedures and Principles, (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2016); B.A. 
Andreassen and V. K. Vinh (eds.) Duties Across Borders: Advancing Human Rights in Transnational 
Business, (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2016)  
56 O. De Schutter, “Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights”, (2016) 1 Business and Human 
Rights Journal, 45 
57 Maastricht Principles, n 4, Preamble.  
58 De Schutter, Towards a New Treaty, n 56 p. 44 




expression of the obligation to protect is also relevant for ETOs.59 While states may be 
responsible for violations of the obligation to respect human rights beyond their own 
borders, for instance through belligerent occupation, other control over foreign territory 
and/or persons, etc., for the purpose of the present chapter, the focus is on the obligation 
to protect.  According to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,60 the obligation to protect ‘requires States to prevent violations of 
[economic, social and cultural rights] by third parties’.61  This has been confirmed for 
ETOs in the Maastricht Principles, and the discussion below will apply the relevant 
provisions of these Principles to analyse how the regulation of TNCs could work in a 
future treaty on business and human rights.  
 
Section IV of the Maastricht Principles concerns the obligation to protect, and stipulates 
clearly in Principle 23 that ‘all states must take action, separately, and jointly through 
international cooperation, to protect economic, social and cultural rights of persons 
within their territories and extraterritorially’.  The subsequent principles detail how the 
obligation to protect should be understood and implemented.  Notably, Principle 24 
entitled ‘Obligation to regulate’ provides that:  
All States must take necessary measures to ensure that non-State actors which 
they are in a positon to regulate […], such as private individuals and 
organisations, and transnational corporation and other business enterprises, do 
not nullify or impair the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.  
These include administrative, legislative, adjudicatory and other measures.  All 
other States have a duty to refrain from nullifying or impairing the discharge of 
the obligation to protect.  
 
Thus, this Principle deals directly with the obligation to regulate TNCs, and Principle 
25 gives the bases for protection and specifies in terms of TNCs that states must adopt 
                                                          
59 Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle no. 9 
60 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Guidelines), 
adopted by a group of expert meeting in Maastricht January 1997.   
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html (last visited 30 October 2015)  
61 Ibid., guideline 6.  




and enforce measures to protect economic, social and cultural rights inter alia where ‘a) 
the harm or threat of harm originates or occurs on its territory; b) where the non-state 
actor has the nationality of the State concerned; and c) regarding business enterprises, 
where the corporation, or its parent or controlling company, has its centre of activity, is 
registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantial business 
activities, in the State concerned. […]’.62 The obligation to regulate the conduct of non-
state actors, including TNCs, comes from a state’s general international law obligation 
to ‘control the activities of private persons within its state territory and the duty is no 
less applicable where the harm is caused to persons or other legal interests within the 
territory of another state’.63 This approach has been confirmed by a number of UN 
human rights committees, including the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which, among others, in its concluding observation on a report from Austria 
observed that:  
The Committee is concerned at the lack of oversight over Austrian companies 
operating abroad with regard to the negative impact of their activities on 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in host countries (art.2). 
 
The Committee urges the State party to ensure that all economic, social and 
cultural rights are fully respected and rights holders adequately protected in the 
context of corporate activities, including by establishing appropriate laws and 
regulations, together with monitoring, investigation and accountability 
procedures to set and enforce standards for the performance of corporations, as 
underlined in the Committee’s statement on the obligations of States parties 
regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights.64  
                                                          
62 Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle 25.  
63 Brownlie, Ian (1983) System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, (part 1), at 165; as quoted in 
Maastricht Commentary, n 29, 1136.  
64 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concluding Observations – Austria, 
E/CN.12/2011/1; para. 12.  The Committee now regularly point to the lack of regulation by States of the 
TNCs over which they have regulatory control, and this also goes further to include international 
investments.  In the concluding observations on the report from Norway in 2013, the Committee 
commented on Norway’s sovereign fund: ‘6. The Committee is concerned that the various steps taken by 
the State party in the context of the social responsibility of the Government Pension Fund Global have not 
included the institutionalization of systematic human rights impact assessments of its investments. The 
Committee recommends that the State party ensure that investments by the Norges Bank Investment 
Management in foreign companies operating in third countries are subject to a comprehensive human rights 
impact assessment (prior to and during the investment). The Committee also recommends that the State 
party adopt policies and other measures to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations that 





It is not merely the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that is now 
including recommendations to states to regulate the activities of TNCs over which they 
exert control.  This is now also common practice for the Human Rights Committee, 
which for instance in its discussion of the German report noted that ‘The State party is 
encouraged to set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in 
its territory and/or its jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the 
Covenant throughout their operations.’65 Furthermore, the Committee on Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination against Women,66 the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child,67 and the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination,68 all question, 
when examining state reports, the lack of regulation for extraterritorial activities on part 
of TNCs that may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights. 
 
In terms of the basis for regulation, the Commentary to the Maastricht Principles notes 
that what is reflected in Principle 25 is the active personality principle whereby a state 
may regulate the conduct of its nationals abroad.69 However, as it is at times hard to 
determine the actual nationality of some business enterprises, Principle 25 provides that 
such regulation by a state may be carried out if that TNC has its ‘centre of activity, is 
registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantial business 
activities, in the State concerned’. This rationale will allow states to regulate the conduct 
of companies that use the separation of legal personality to avoid or limit the scope of 
their legal liability.70 
                                                          
have their main offices under the jurisdiction of the State party, without infringing the sovereignty or 
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65 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Germany, CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6 (12 November 
2012), para. 16. 
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An issue related to this was raised in the Commentary to Principle 2 of the UNGP,71 
where it was argued that ‘there are strong policy reasons for home States to set out 
clearly the expectation that businesses respect human rights abroad, especially where 
the State itself is involved in or support those businesses’.72 From an obligation to 
protect human rights as part of the tri-partite classification of human rights obligations, 
and the clear acceptance that this level of obligation relate to a state’s duty to ensure 
that third parties, such as private TNCs, do not infringe the enjoyment of human rights 
of individuals, the distinction between enterprises that are fully private, or partially 
‘state involved or supported’ does not make much difference.  The focus is on the state’s 
obligation to regulate the conduct of private entities as well as their own behaviour.  
Therefore, in terms of regulation, both fully private and partially state-owned companies 
should be included.  
In addition to situations where states are in a position to regulate the conduct of TNCs 
when operating abroad, the Maastricht Principles also contain reference to situations 
where this is not directly the case, but where they are in a ‘position to influence’.  By 
this, the Principles refers to situation where a state can influence the conduct of a non-
state actor (including TNCs), for instance, through their public procurement system or 
through international diplomacy.73   
 
 
5 Overcoming Problems of Extraterritorial Regulation 
 
It is essential to also deal with some of the predictable problems that will occur in the 
drafting process of the treaty, and also in terms of the arguments that will be used to 
oppose the obligations of states to regulate the activities of ‘their’ businesses abroad.  
Going from permissible regulation based on principles  of prescriptive jurisdiction that 
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domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.”, UNGP, n 14.  
72 Ibid., commentary to Principle 2, p. 4. 
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clearly have no territorial limitations74, what an obligation on state regulation of TNCs 
activities abroad would in essence do would be to make such regulation not only 
‘permissible’ but rather ‘mandatory’.  It would remove the discretion of whether or not 
to regulate from states, but at the same time it would enhance the global human rights 
protection and ensure that those standards that states have accepted through the 
international bill of human rights become truly universal.  
However, difficulties will arise, and a few of those will be addressed briefly here.  First, 
states will be hesitant to accept responsibility to regulate for ‘predicted effect’. Principle 
13 of the Maastricht Principles articulates states obligation to avoid causing harm as 
follows:   
States must desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying 
or impairing the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially.  The responsibility of States is engaged where such 
nullification or impairment is a foreseeable result of their conduct.  
Uncertainty about potential impacts does not constitute justification for such 
conduct.75   
Invoking this principle in relation to state regulation of TNCs, it will be a breach of 
obligation if the state failed to regulate conduct by these actors that might predictably 
create risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of human rights.  This implies that 
the state needs to be pro-active and consider what the content of regulation may bring 
about in terms of human rights respect or violations; as the lack of regulation (omission) 
which leads to human rights violations would indeed be a breach of their obligations.76  
Case-law confirms that while acts cannot be attributed to a state just by the fact that 
they took place on their territory, they nevertheless may be expected to ‘give an 
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75 Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle 13 
76 The Maastricht Principles reflects this through an ‘obligation to avoid causing harm’: ‘States must desist from 
acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights extraterritorially. The responsibility of States is engaged where such nullification or impairment is 
a foreseeable result of their conduct. Uncertainty about potential impacts does not constitute justification for 
such conduct.’ Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principle 13.  




explanation’ if the state knew or should have known that ‘activities unlawful under 
international law’ were perpetrated on its territory and caused damage to another state.77 
Thus, in such situations, a state’s obligation to exercise due diligence will be triggered.  
For example, in a report by the Council of Europe on the allegations of European state’s 
involvement in extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects by the United States, the 
following was critically noted:  
It has to be said that most governments did not seem particularly eager to 
establish the alleged facts. The body of information gathered makes it unlikely 
that European states were completely unaware of what was happening, in the 
context of the fight against international terrorism, in some of their airports, in 
their airspace or at American bases located on their territory. Insofar as they did 
not know, they did not want to know. It is inconceivable that certain operations 
conducted by American services could have taken place without the active 
participation, or at least the collusion, of national intelligence services. If this 
were the case, one would be justified in seriously questioning the effectiveness, 
and therefore the legitimacy, of such services.78 
 Consequently, there is now acceptance that there is a duty upon states reasonably to 
ensure that activities originating or taking place within their jurisdiction will not be 
breaching international law provisions, including human rights enjoyment in the 
territory of another state.79 The acceptance of the precautionary principle (particularly 
in international environmental law) also demonstrates that uncertainty about the full 
effect of planned measures is not an acceptable defence against taking mitigating action 
if future harm may ensue.80 
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parties from violating the right[s protected under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights] in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.’ General Comment no. 14 
‘The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)’, E/C.12/2000/4, para. 39  
80 Marr makes a distinction between the ‘preventive principle’ and the ‘precautionary principle’ in the 
following manner: ‘the preventive principle provides for an obligation of state to prevent known or 
foreseeable harm outside their territory’, while ‘the precautionary principle [….] requires environmental 
action at an earlier step: It provides a tool for dealing with situations where there is a potential hazard, but 




Another problem that may come to the fore in discussion on the proposed treaty is the 
problem of joint or shared obligations.  Will states be willing to accept the entire 
responsibility for violations of international human rights standards on the part of TNCs 
just because they did not regulate the relevant conduct?  Since traditional human rights 
law has focused uniquely on violations by the domestic state in situations where the 
legal relationship between the victim of the violation and the state has been fairly 
straight forward, it will be a rather new step to introduce concepts of shared or joint 
obligations in the treaty.  Depending on how the treaty will be framed, and in particular 
how the concept of obligations subjects will be conceptualised, such an introduction of 
shared or joint obligations may be necessary.  It may be that two states (the home and 
the host) may be jointly responsible, and indeed part of the responsibility may also lie 
with a particular company.  This is a complex situation, but one that may well need to 
be tackled, including by evolution or clarification subsequently by a treaty body looking 
at concrete circumstances.  
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis made in this chapter has attempted to bring the role of the state back into 
the discussion on TNCs and human rights.  It has been demonstrated that a rejection of 
states’ ETOs is contrary to the fundamental principle of universality of human rights.  
The objections to ETOs have been addressed, and proposals for how future regulation 
by states for the behaviour of TNCs over which they exert control have been made.  
 
The environment within which international human rights law is now operating is far 
more complex in terms of international interaction and the actors involved on a global 
scale than was the case immediately after the Second World War.  As stated at the 
outset, unless international human rights law manages to make necessary changes in its 
structures and modes of operation, it is in danger of becoming irrelevant for thousands 
of victims in life conditions that would be considered serious human rights violations 
                                                          
scientific uncertainty as to the impact of the environmentally sensitive activity does not allow a clear 
prediction of the degree of the hazards to the environment.’  S. Marr The Precautionary Principle in the 
Law of the Sea, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), p. 9. 




by non-lawyers.  It is, therefore, particularly important that a business and human rights 
treaty drafted at the current point in time takes this challenge on board and ensures that 
the provisions of the treaty contribute to this renewed relevance of international human 
rights law. In this sense, the proposal for the treaty represents a real constructive 
opportunity for the international human rights community.  
 
Building on the Maastricht Principles, I propose below how the international human 
rights community could use the BHR treaty as a real opportunity to get a positive 
codification of states’ obligations to protect human rights extraterritorially. What ETOs 
do in this context is to emphasise that the state has obligations both domestically and 
abroad when they affect human rights enjoyment, or when they can influence human 
rights enjoyment through regulation for instance.  The recognition of ETOs thus 
removes the argument that certain actors’ behaviour is ‘beyond the control’ of a state 
when that state clearly has a regulatory opportunity to improve human rights enjoyment.   
 
States’ regulation of corporation activities to be in compliance with international human 
rights standards both when they operate at ‘home’ and in another country, will have a 
positive impact on universal human rights enjoyment. Moreover, it will create a level 
playing field for companies and thus the ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of human rights 
and environmental protection for those affected by the activities of TNCs and other 
business practices will lose much of its energy.  
 
The problem with opposition to ETOs is that states hesitate to accept the responsibility 
that comes with acting within their jurisdiction, while wishing to retain the liberty to act 
internationally.  This is where we return to the early days of international human rights 
law development as mentioned in the introduction: states had initially rejected the idea 
of human rights being a matter of legitimate international concern on the ground that 
these issues were for domestic sovereignty and jurisdiction. Yet, that objection was not 
accepted, and states now (reluctantly) recognise that the international community has a 
legitimate interest in the way in which individuals are treated by their own government.  
The task at the present juncture in international human rights law development is to 
achieve a similar acceptance for extraterritorial activities: that the international human 




rights standards set limits for what states can legitimately do in their international 
relations as well as domestically.   
 
  




Annex – proposal for treaty provision on states’ obligation to regulate  
Obligation to regulate81 
1. In compliance with the obligation to protect, all States must take necessary measures to 
ensure that transnational corporations and other business enterprises which they are in a 
position to regulate, do not nullify or impair the enjoyment of human rights within their 
territories and extraterritorially. These include administrative, legislative, investigative, 
adjudicatory and other measures. All other States have a duty to refrain from nullifying or 
impairing the discharge of this obligation to protect. 
 
2. States must adopt and enforce measures to protect human rights through legal and other 
means, including diplomatic means, in each of the following circumstances: 
 
a) when the harm or threat of harm originates or occurs on its territory; 
b) where the transnational corporation or another business enterprise, or its parent or 
controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has its main 
place of business or substantial business activities, in the State concerned 
 
3. States that are in a position to influence the conduct of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises even if they are not in a position to regulate such conduct, such as 
through their public procurement system or international diplomacy, should exercise such 
influence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and general international law, 
in order to protect economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
 
                                                          
81 The proposed text is adapted from the Maastricht Principles, n 4, Principles 23 through 26.  
